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JUDICIAL HIGHLIGHT
PENNSYLVANIA PROPERTY CASES OF 1958
By WILLIAM H. DODD,* Assisted by Howard N. Stark,
John M. Kuchka, Vincent P. Paglianete
PERSONAL PROPERTY

Gifts
In Balfour's Estate v. Seitz ' evidence that a savings account in a bank was
changed from the name of the depositor to the name of the depositor or his
daughter in the presence and at the instruction of both of the parties was held'
to be insufficient to establish donative intent and delivery to uphold the daughter's claim of a gift inter vivos of the balance of the account against the depositor's estate. The teller at the time of making the change explained to the parties
that the account would belong to the survivor if either of the parties died. No
signature card, withdrawal agreement or survival agreement was signed by the
parties, and the passbook was found among the depositor's papers at his death.
Without deciding whether a prima facie gift would be established if the acts
of the parties should be construed to be an oral agreement, as the lower court
had held, the Supreme Court doubted that an oral agreement was made out by
the evidence and considered that it constituted only some evidence of donative
intent.
Tenancy by the Entireties
In a case said to be of the first impression, Stitzinger v. Stitzinger Lumber
Co., 2 the Superior Court held that a husband and wife, tenants by the entireties,
could not recover from the husband's employer the damages to their realty
caused by the husband-while operating defendant's station wagon in the course
of his employment. The court recognized that under the Pennsylvania concept
of a tenancy by the entireties each spouse was considered to be the owner of the
entire property, that any action to protect such property must be brought in
the names of both, and that any recovery enured to the benefit of both. Therefore, the court concluded that the considerations of policy which precluded the
* Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law; B.A., Dickinson College; LL.B., Dickinson
School of Law.
1 392 Pa. 300, 140 A.2d 441 (1958).
2 187 Pa. Super. 453, 144 A.2d 486 (1958).
[ 127]

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 63

husband's recovering for damages inflicted by himself upon his own property
would preclude not only his recovery from his employer for the damages to
the entireties property but also the wife. The lower court's action in granting
defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings as to this portion of the complaint was affirmed.
Although ordinarily one tenant by the entireties may not compel partition
of the entireties property during the marriage, a contrary rule had been applied
in Berhalter v. Berhaltera to a bank account held by the entireties where one of
the spouses withdrew part of the fund for his exclusive use for the purpose
of depriving the other of any interest therein. In Watkins v. Watkins' the
spouses owned four savings accounts as tenants by the entireties. The husband
had withdrawn funds from one account for his own purposes. He admitted he
was about to close out another account at the time the wife filed a bill in equity
'for relief from the interference with her property interests. The two other
accounts were untouched and unthreatened. The Supreme Court affirmed on
the opinion of the lower court that the Berhalter case was based upon the view
that a wife should not be forced to continue subject to the risk of misappropriations after her husband had demonstrated his disregard of the obligations of the
tenancy by improper withdrawals. The wife was held to be entitled to one-half
of the highest balance of all the accounts (except one as to which the parties had
made an agreement) with interest from the date of the trial at the legal rate.
Replevin
Plaintiff instituted an action of replevin without bond in the Court of
Common Pleas of Berks County in County Construction Company v. Livengood
Construction Corporation.' Plaintiff sought to establish its right to possession
of road machinery in which it had a security interest, to recover its value or to
compel its return with damages for its wrongful detention. Defendant corporation had removed the machinery to Northampton County prior to the commencement of the action. In support of preliminary objections to the venue of the
action in Berks County defendant contended that the action of replevin without
bond, as provided by Pa. R.C.P. 1071-1086,' is by its nature an action in rem
and must be brought in the county in which the goods are located at the time of
suit. Stating that the action of replevin without bond was a personal action
since the plaintiff need not seek repossession of the goods with damages for
unlawful detention nor post security for their recovery, the Supreme Court held
3 315

Pa. 225, 173 At. 172 (1934).
4393 Pa. 284, 142 A.2d 6 (1958).
5 393 Pa. 39, 142 A.2d 9 (1958).
SPA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, appendix (1951).
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the action was properly brought against a corporation in a county in which there
had been a transaction or occurrence out of which the cause of action arose under
subsection 4 of Pa. R.C.P. 2179 (a).
JUDGMENTS

The question in Norristown Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Erwin,8 another case said to be of first impression, was whether the lien of a
judgment against a bankrupt's real estate which had not been revived after the
adjudication of bankruptcy retained its priority. At the request of the mortgagee, the referee in bankruptcy entered an order giving him leave to foreclose
his mortgage. After judgment in an action of mortgage foreclosure the sheriff
sold the real estate on a writ of levari facias. At the time of the adjudication
of bankruptcy the judgment lien in question was junior only to the first mortgage. At the time the referee authorized the mortgagee to foreclose more than
five years had elapsed from the date on which the judgment had been entered.
Under section 2 of the Pennsylvania Judgment Lien Law' the lien continues
for a period of five years from the date of entry of the judgment unless revived.
It was conceded that the failure to revive the lien of the judgment would have
been immaterial if the distribution had been made in the federal court in the
bankruptcy proceeding. The Superior Court affirmed the decision of the lower
court dismissing the judgment creditor's exceptions to the sheriff's failure to
include the judgment in the schedule of distribution of the proceeds of the sale
of the realty on the ground that the referee's order was an abandonment of the
real estate as an asset in the bankrupt estate. The Pennsylvania Judgment Lien
Law governed the question of priority of lien rather than the federal bankruptcy
statute.
TAx SALES

° an
Castrodale,1

In Carratelliv.
action to quiet title brought by a plaintiff
claiming as a grantee of the land under a deed from the county commissioners
who had acquired the lands under a tax sale from the county treasurer, the
Superior Court affirmed the lower court's refusal to take off a compulsory nonsuit. The tax sale and treasurer's deed were void because the land in question
had not been sold to the county commissioners by the county treasurer separately
but had been combined for sale with other tracts owned by the same taxpayer
which had been separately assessed. Further, the description was defective in
that it failed to show the geographical location of the land in question.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, appendix (Supp. 1958).
8 186 Pa. Super. 81, 140 A.2d 458 (1958).
9
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 878 (1953).
10185 Pa. Super. 426, 137 A.2d 805 (1958).
7
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In Pintek v. County of Allegheny "' three taxing authorities, a borough, a
county, and a school district, elected to take title in proportion to their tax claims
to an apartment building which was sold at a tax sale under the provisions of
the Act of 1941.12 Fire insurance was taken out in the names of the three taxing
bodies, a real estate agent was authorized to collect the rents (which were to be
applied toward the payment of taxes), and all tenants were told to pay rent to
the real estate agent as the representative of the three taxing bodies. A tenant's
minor child was injured in a fall when a step on a fire escape broke. The parents, as guardians and in their own right, recovered a judgment in an action of
trespass against the three taxing bodies for the injuries sustained by the child
in the fall. The county, borough, and school district appealed from the lower
court's refusal to grant a judgment n.o.v. on the ground that they were subdivisions of the Commonwealth performing a governmental function and were,
therefore, immune from tort liability. Conceding that the collection of taxes
was a governmental function, the Supreme Court declared that as soon as the
taxing bodies elected to bid in the property at the tax sale their function became
proprietary. The court held it made no difference that a petition for redemption
was pending and that a final order directing the three taxing bodies to convey
to the redeemer on payment of the proper sums had been entered several months
before the accident and the deed was actually delivered twelve days after the
accident. The possession, control and liability for negligence in the maintenance
of the land remained with the taxing authorities until the redemption was completed by payment of the correct amount of money due.
DODD.
ZONING

Constitutionality of Zoning Ordinances
In Bilbar Construction Company v. Board of Adjustment 13 a zoning ordinance requiring a minimum area of one acre and a minimum frontage of 150
feet for the construction of a single-family dwelling in an "A" residential district
was held (three dissenters) to be constitutionally valid when applied against a
subdivider who planned to erect a dwelling on a smaller lot. A companion case,
Best v. Zoning Board of Adjustment," sustained (three dissenters in part) the
constitutionality of an ordinance permitting only single-family dwellings in a
"C" district as applied against the owner of a 22-room and seven bath mansion
who proposed to house fifteen tenants therein. Perhaps the most significant
11 186 Pa. Super 366, 142 A.2d 296 (1958).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 6151.1 et seq. (1950).
13 393 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d 851 (1958).
14 393 Pa. 106, 141 A.2d 606 (1958).
12
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aspect of these cases is that in the Best case the Court held that although applying the ordinance to the mansion would not promote the public health, safety
or morals, the validity of the ordinance could be supported on considerations of
general welfare alone.15
Zoning ordinances which authorize the erection of specified structures provided a number of neighboring property owners consent may raise serious
constitutional questions according to a footnote appended to In Re Hertrick's
Appeal.1" Although such an ordinance was involved in this case its constitutionality was not questioned by counsel, and the disposition of the case rendered
determination of the constitutional question unnecessary. In a concurring opinion, however, Justice Bell indicated that he considered such an ordinance, by its
terms, to be an unconstitutional delegation of the police power.
The holding of Home Life Insurance Co. v. Board of Adjustment 17 was
that the Company could not apply to the township administrative officer for a
variance allowing the erection of an apartment house, appeal to the Board of
Adjustment from his refusal of the application, and then attack the constitutional validity of the ordinance before the Board without ever seeking a building
permit or submitting any plans or drawings of a proposed building. The Court
said (1) that the constitutionality of the ordinance could be determined only
when applied against the rights of some person and not in vacuo, and (2) that
the proper procedure was to apply for a building permit, submitting plans or at
least a drawing of a proposed structure with the application.
Variances
Justice Benjamin R. Jones had the following to say of variances in Richman
v.PhiladelphiaZoning Board of Adjustment: 18
"The sole justification for the grant of a variance is that a strict application of the terms of a zoning statute will result in an 'unnecessary hardship',

and, even then, the variance can be granted only if 'the spirit of the ordinance
may be observed, the public health, safety and general welfare secured and
substantial justice done'. He who seeks a variance has the burden of proving
justification for its grant. The 'hardship' which must be proven must be an
'unnecessary', not a 'mere' hardship, as well as 'unique or peculiar to [to
property involved] as distinguished from the impact of the zoning regulations
on the entire district'. The fact that an increase or decrease in value will
result from the grant or refusal of a variance will not, standing alone, constitute a sufficient hardship.
15 Accord, Swade v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 392 Pa. 269, 140 A.2d 597 (1958).
16 391 Pa. 148, 137 A.2d 310 (1958).
17 393 Pa. 447, 143 A.2d 21 (1958).
18 391 Pa. 254, 137 A.2d 280 (1958).
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"On an appeal from the grant or refusal of a variance we examine the
record only to ascertain whether the action taken was clearly arbitrary, capricious
or unreasonable or in clear violation of positive law. The grant of a variance

depends on the circumstances of each particular case and evidence of the grant
of similar variance in similarly zoned areas is not admissible."
In this case a tenant under a five year lease sought a variance permitting him to
use the premises as an interior decorator's office for consultation only. The
evidence before the zoning board indicated (1) the premises had been used as
a dentist's office up until 1936 and, subsequent thereto and until the tenant's
occupancy, as a doctor's office, (2) a zoning permit was granted in 1936 for a
doctor's office, and (3) fifty per cent of the buildings on the block housed professional offices. Concluding as a matter of law that an "unnecessary hardship"
was present, the board granted a permit for the proposed use but made no finding of fact as to "unnecessary hardship". In the lower court additional testimony
was taken to the effect that (1) a clause in the lease expressly stated that the
owner did not warrant that the tenant would be able to obtain a permit for the
proposed use and that, if a permit could not be obtained, the lease would not be
terminated, (2) the tenant did not know of this clause when he signed the lease,
(3) the tenant spent $1,300 to $1,400 in repairs and renovations on the premises,

(4) the tenant was a heart victim who spent one or two nights a week sleeping
on the premises rather than travel to his home, and (5) if the tenant moved
into an office building it would cost him money to stay in a hotel twice a week.
The lower court affirmed the zoning board's decision, reasoning that the board
had not abused its discretion so as to require a reversal. The Supreme Court
reversed, indicating (1) there was no evidence before the board of any hardship
to the tenant or the owner peculiar to the property involved, (2) since the lower
court had taken additional testimony it should have considered the matter de
novo, (3) the tenant, whether considered as the owner's agent or in his own
right, could apply for a variance although the owner did not join in the application,' 9 (4) the evidence before the lower court did not constitute the "unnecessary hardship" required for a variance, and (5) the lower court improperly
considered the possibility or probability of hardship to the owner of the premises
since he was not a party to the proceedings and there was no evidence of hardship as to him.
The holding in Gold v. Zoning Board of Adjustment 20 was that one who
had been a barber for forty years and was too ill to work for others had not
established the hardship requisite for a variance permitting him to conduct a
19 Accord, Nicholson v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 392 Pa. 278, 140 A.2d 604 (1958).
20 393 Pa. 401, 143 A.2d 59 (1958).
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one-chair, appointment-only barbershop in his dwelling. The Court reasoned
that the hardship must be peculiar to the applicant's property and not his person.
In Moyerman v. Glanzberg " the petitioner, believing his property to be
wider than it actually was, stated its width incorrectly in his application for a
building permit. After the permit was granted the petitioner began the construction of a dwelling. When the building was substantially completed the
petitioner discovered the actual width of his land and that he had violated the
side yard "set back" requirements of the zoning ordinance. He applied to
the zoning board for a variance, which was granted after a finding that the distance separating the petitioner's dwelling from the dwelling next door was
greater than the "set back" requirements. The Supreme Court, quoting from
the Richman case, held that the grant of the variance was proper since the requisite "unnecessary hardship" existed and the public health, safety and general
welfare would not be adversely affected.
The zoning board erroneously granted a variance to an applicant in In Re
Riccardi's Appeal.2 After little more than the excavation was completed, one
appealing from the board's decision gave the applicant notice in writing to hold
back until final determination of the appeal. Nevertheless, the applicant finished construction of his dwelling. The Supreme Court held that the applicant
had chosen to go forward and suffer the consequences and was not entitled to
a variance from the side yard "set back" requirements of the ordinance although
the one appealing from the board's decision had not obtained a supersedeas.
The refusal of a variance was held proper in Smolow v. City of Philadelphia
Zoning Board of Adjustment 2 where (1) the petitioner purchased the property expecting a variance or a rezoning of the area, (2) the petitioner would
lose $500 which he spent making alterations to his basement in the anticipation
of opening a real estate office in his dwelling, (3) the petitioner could not make
as much money working for some other real estate man as he could by operating
his own real estate office in his dwelling, (4) three doctors maintained their
offices in their homes in petitioner's district (a use specifically permitted by the
ordinance), and (5) commercial stores were permitted on the other side of
the street. The hardship was not shown to be "unique" to the petitioner's
property.
The holding of Nicholson v. Zoning Board of Adjustment 2"was that a
variance (with conditions atta&ed) was properly granted since the requisite
391
22393
23 391
24 392
21

Pa.
Pa.
Pa.
Pa.

387, 138 A.2d 681 (1958).
337, 142 A.2d 289 (1958).
71, 137 A.2d 251 (1958).
278, 140 A.2d 604 (1958).

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

(VOL. 63

"unnecessary hardship" was made out where (1) the property was unsuited
for and could not be developed for the purpose (residential) for which it was
zoned, (2) the property was a "peninsula" jutting down from a residential
district, entirely surrounded, except for a vacant lot, by commercial districts or
uses, and (3) the proposed use (parking and storage of trucks) was permitted
in the commercial districts surrounding the property.
In In Re Edwards' Appeal 25 the petitioner, planning to construct an office
building for the staff physicians of a nearby hospital (apparently a permitted
use in this single-family-residence area), purchased property for $28,000. The
normal estimated value of the property (including a dwelling) was $12,000.
When the petitioner's plan fell through he sought a variance permitting the
erection of an apartment building. The Supreme Court held that the lower
court had abused its discretion in granting a variance since (1) single family
homes could be erected upon the property and sold, although not at prices which
would permit the petitioner to recover his investment, and (2) other homes in
the district were subjected to the same heavy traffic, unsightly electric transformer station, and institutional uses as the petitioner's land.
PhiladelphiaDress. Beef Co. v. Zoning Board of Adj. 8 apparently held
that the refusal of a variance was proper where the proposed use (operation of
a freezer-warehouse in the contemplated structure) would be contrary to the
public interest in that it would increase already hazardous traffic conditions and
endanger the safety of children attending a nearby school.
Construction of Zoning Ordinances
In a case decided in 1956, Novello v. Zoning Board of Adjustment," the
Supreme Court held that under section 16 of a 1933 Philadelphia zoning ordinance the washing of cars was a permitted use in an "A Commercial" district
since it was "customarily accessory and incidental to" the operation of "a public
or commercial garage or repair shop, gas and oil service stations". In October,
1956, six months after the Novello case, the City Council of Philadelphia
adopted a zoning ordinance which carried forward without change section 16
of the 1933 ordinance but changed the use restrictions in a "B Commercial"
district to expressly permit car washing establishments. The "B" classification
was less restricted than the "A", embracing, inter alia, all the uses permitted
in an "A" district. In Parisi v. Philadelphia Zoning Board of Adjustment "
the Supreme Court held that the adoption of the 1956 ordinance did not work
25 392 Pa. 188, 140 A.2d 110 (1958).

391 Pa. 111, 137 A.2d 270 (1958).
384 Pa. 294, 121 A.2d 91 (1956).
28 393 Pa. 458, 143 A.2d 360 (1958).
23

27
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an implied repeal of section 16 as construed in the Novello case, that by carrying
forward section 16 without change the City Council had approved of the earlier
construction.
Other 1958 Supreme Court decisions construing zoning ordinances held
that:
(1) In an ordinance permitting the erection of a "gasoline service station"
-provided a majority of the owners of property within 100 feet of the "proposed structure" consent-"proposed structure" referred to the proposed main
building and not the whole integrated service station including signs, light
standards, pumps, gasoline tanks and other facilities.2
(2) The production of synthetic compost, an artificial horse manure used
in growing mushrooms, was an allowable use under an ordinance permitting
'farming in all its branches"."
(3) The parking and storage of trucks was a permitted use under an ordinance prohibiting "commercial warehouses".3
(4) An ordinance authorizing the use of a building as a "public garage
or service station" and "any use of the same general character . . . provided
no use which is noxious or hazardous shall be permitted" did not authorize the
operation of a tire recapping and retreading business. 2
(5) Conducting a one-chair, appointment-only barbershop was not an
"occupation customarily conducted in dwellings as an incidental use" under a
zoning regulation permitting such occupations as accessory uses."
(6) The operation of a predominantly wholesale textile business, including sales to customers at some distance from the store, was prohibited by an
ordinance providing that no premises should be used except as "retail stores
for sale of food products, wearing apparel, drugs, confectionary, tobacco and

general merchandise for local neighborhood use' '.14

Amending Zoning Ordinance After Application for Permit
In In Re Hertrick's Appeal" a borough zoning ordinance provided that a
gasoline service station could be erected if the application for a building permit
29 In Re Hertrick's Appeal, 391 Pa. 148, 137 A.2d 310 (1958).
30 Gaspari v. Board of Adjustment of Township, 392 Pa. 7, 139 A.2d 544 (1958).
31 Nicholson v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 392 Pa. 278, 140 A.2d 604 (1958).
32

Caplan v. Bensalem Township Zoning Board of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 20, 141 A.2d 578

(1958).
Gold v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 401, 143 A.2d 59 (1958).
Board of Zoning Appeals of City of Scranton v. Silas, 393 Pa. 10, 142 A.2d 24 (1958).
" 391 Pa. 148, 137 A.2d 310 (1958).
33

34

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 63

was accompanied by the written consent of a majority of the owners of property
within 100 feet of the proposed structure. An application for a permit, together
with the necessary consents, was filed under this ordinance. While an appeal
by the borough from the decision of the zoning board was pending in the county
court, the borough amended the ordinance to require the consent of eighty per
cent of the owners of property within 110 feet of the deed line of the property in
question. The Supreme Court held that the case was controlled by the ordinance
as it stood at the time the application was filed, and that under the ordinance at
that time the applicant was entitled to a permit. In doing this the Court distinguished prior cases holding that a building permit could be refused (or revoked if the applicant had not incurred substantial obligations relying thereon)
if at the time of the application there was pending an amendment to the zoning
ordinance which would prohibit the proposed use. The Court's rationale was
that the prior cases sought to prevent the creation of a non-conforming use after
the effective date of a pending zoning ordinance; the amendment in this case
did not affect the use to which land could be put but merely changed the procedure necessary to obtain a building permit.
Non-conforming Uses
In Null v. Power " a non-conforming use (manufacturing machine nuts
and screw products) was conducted on the premises from before 1933 until 1942.
From 1933 to 1954 the premises were used for storage. In 1954 the owner
applied for a permit for a 25 per cent extension, intending to resume the earlier
use. The zoning ordinance provided that "A non-conforming use when discontinued may be resumed as the same non-conforming use and no other."
The lower court held that the use of the premises for storage was a discontinuance and not an abandonment, and reversed the zoning board's refusal of a
permit. The Supreme Court affirmed on the opinion of the lower court.
The facts involved in In Re Yocum " were quite unique. At the time the
zoning ordinance was adopted the first floor of the building in question extended
beyond the front and side yard "set back" requirements of the ordinance. Subsequent to the adoption of the ordinance the owners of the property proposed
to extend the second floor of the building forward to coincide with the front of
the first floor. In holding that a building permit should be issued the Supreme
Court stated that "we are considering not a non-conforming general use . .
but a building whose juxtaposition on the land renders it non-conforming." The
Court concluded that allowance of a building permit would not be the grant
36 391 Pa. 51, 137 A.2d 316 (1958).
37 393 Pa. 148, 141 A.2d 601 (1958).
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of a variance or an exception or the extension of a non-conforming use, and
that the court below had properly granted a building permit.
In Re Associated Contractors" involved a one story office building erected
in 1912. In 1938 the area was zoned for residential uses. During the 1939 to
1944 war-time housing shortage the building was used as a residence. Before
and after its use as a residence the building was used as a real estate office, a
dentist's office, a doctor's office, a medical laboratory, a sporting goods office,
and a steel company's office. In 1952 an application stating that "The present
building is used as an office building" resulted in the grant of a permit allowing
construction of a 5 by 5 foot addition for washroom facilities. But in 1955 the
board of adjustment rejected an application for a permit to erect a 12 by 30 foot
addition to accommodate filing cabinets made necessary by the steel company's
expansion of business. According to the ordinance: "Whenever a non-conforming use of a building or premises has been discontinued or changed into a
higher classification or to a conforming use such use shall not thereafter be
changed to a use of a lower classification." The Supreme Court affirmed the
lower court's reversal of the board's decision, indicating (1) the use of the building for office purposes was not discontinued (the court pointed out that "discontinued" meant "abandoned") in 1938 since the basic character of the building
was not changed, (2) the present use of the building was not a lower zoning
use than the one in existence at the time the ordinance was adopted since the
building was an office building and had never been anything else, and (3)
the proposed use was the natural development and growth of a non-conforming
use, although ten persons instead of six could be employed on the premises.
Right to Examine Field Investigation Notes
In Wiley v. Woods" one Wiley petitioned for the rezoning of a portion
of Wallingford Street. The Planning Commission of the City of Pittsburgh
denied the petition because it was inconsistent with a proposed zoning ordinance
then pending before City Council. Subsequent to the Commission's denial a
member of City Council made an inquiry concerning the matter. Pursuant to
this inquiry a staff member of the Department of City Planning made a survey
of the properties in that portion of Wallingford Street; then he prepared field
investigation notes and a report which was made to the member of City Council
who had made the inquiry. Wiley sought to examine all data in the Department
of City Planning pertaining to the petition for rezoning. The data in that office
consisted of (1) the report made to the member of City Council, (2) the record
of the Commission's denial of the rezoning petition, and (3) the field investiga38 391 Pa. 347, 138 A.2d 99 (1958).
39 393 Pa. 341, 141 A.2d 844 (1958).
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tion notes. Wiley was not allowed to examine the field investigation notes.
She brought an action of mandamus in the lower court against the Planning
Director, the Department of City Planning, and the Planning Commission to
permit her to examine the field investigation notes. The Supreme Court held
that Wiley (1) was not entitled to examine the notes at common law, (2) was
not entitled to examine the notes under section 3 of the Act of 1927, ° which
provides that the Planning Commission "shall keep a record of its resolutions,
transactions, findings, and determinations, which shall be a public record", (3)
was not entitled to examine the notes under the 1957 "right to know" statute, 1
and (4) had not been deprived of her constitutional right to due process of law.
STARK.
WILLS AND DECEDENT'S ESTATES

In LaRosa v. McVicker, 2 the Superior Court of Pennsylvania decided that
a reservation of the use of a home to the husbdnd of testatrix for and during his
natural life or as long as he shall have need therefor was a life estate in the
home and not merely a personal privilege which could be surrendered by establishing a home elsewhere. Here the reservation in the will was after a devise
of the residuary estate in fee simple. However, the court felt that the language
employed was sufficiently indicative of an intent to restrict or cut down the prior
estate.4"
In re Kenny's Estate " was a contest over ownership of accumulated income
of a trust in the form of stock dividends. There a testamentary trust was created
for care and maintenance of a crippled boy which directed that the "entire income" from said principal should be paid to him for his life with power in the
trustee to invade the corpus. The testatrix concluded: "The principal sum remaining together with any undistributed income shall be divided in equal shares
among" the remaindermen. The principal of the trust consisted of a sum of
$5,000 and 24 shares of stock. In rejecting the claim by the remaindermen that
the undistributed stock dividends were undistributed income, the court recited
the established principle that "where words are used in a will sufficient to vest
an absolute estate, such interest is not to be cut down by subsequent provisions,
unless the testator has indicated a clear intent to reduce the estate previously
given." "
40 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 22761 et seq. (1957).
41 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 66.1 et seq. (Supp. 1957).
42 185 Pa. Super. 95, 137 A.2d 861 (1958).

43 Cf. Baldesberger v. Baldesberger, 378 Pa. 113, 105 A.2d 713, 45 A.L.R. 2d 691 (1954).
44 393 Pa. 30, 141 A.2d 839 (1958).
45 Id. at 33, 141 A.2d at 841.
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A very interesting and unusual will came before the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in In re Collins' Estate." A will created a life estate for three children of
testatrix but provided further that if "either of my sons (named) or my daughter
(named) who are mentioned above die, then the surviving one or ones is or are
given, devised and bequeathed the said real estate forever." (emphasis by the
court.) The court held that testatrix intended to provide that if either of her
sons or her daughter died then the life estate terminated and the two survivors
took the real estate in fee simple. In the decision of this case the court relied
on the principle that every word and every clause in a will must, if reasonably
possible, be given effect."7
Litigation resulting from terms of a holographic will was before our Supreme Court in Mitchell v. Clippinger's Heirs.," In that case the court held
that a reference to "the $2000.00 two thousand dollars I have in the home . . ."
was sufficient to pass whatever interest testatrix had in the property to her
nephew and was not a charge on the land of $2,000. The essential fact in the
case was that testatrix and nephew had jointly purchased the home for $4,000
and had continued to live in the home until the demise of testatrix. It is interesting to note that the court states the proposition that "the word 'money' when
used in a will may be construed in the broad sense of wealth or property..." ,"
even though the will involved makes no reference to the word "money" but
merely used the figures and words "$2000.00 two thousand dollars".
The authority to accumulate out of income a temporary reserve to meet
expenses of agents and attorneys incurred in administration of an estate under
51
the Estates Act of 1947 " was the issue before the court in In re Bell's Estate.
The Supreme Court held that where the will gave the corporate executor discretion to compensate agents and attorneys out of either principal or income of
residuary trust, the Estates Act of 1947 authorizes such accumulation out of
income of a temporary reserve as would meet such obligations. The court also
held that such charging against income was not an attempt to increase the
principal of the trust within the meaning of the Act of 1853. 5'
LANDLORD AND TENANT LAW

In Elizabethtown Lodge No. 596 v. Ellis " the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania made it clear that the common law rule of demand for forfeiture for
46 393 Pa. 519, 143 A.2d 45 (1958).
47 See Fiduciary Review, July 1958.
48 392 Pa. 40, 139 A.2d 520 (1958).
4 Id. at 41, 139 A.2d at 521.
50 Act of April 24, 1947, P.L. 100, § 6 (1), 20 P.S. § 301.6 (1) repealed, Act of February 17,
1956, P. L. 1073 (1955), § 3, 20 P.S. § 301.6.
51 393 Pa. 623, 144 A.2d 843 (1958).
52 P.L. 503, § 9, as amended, 20 P.S. § 3251.
53 391 Pa. 19, 137 A.2d 286, (1958).
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nonpayment of rent is still the law in Pennsylvania. The court in reaffirming
this principle noted that unless a demand for rent is expressly waived by terms
of a lease a demand by the lessor is absolutely essential to work a forfeiture
thereof for nonpayment of rent. Also this demand "emust be a demand of the
precise rent due, on the very day on which it becomes due, on the most notorious
place on the land, and a demand must in fact be made on the land, although
there should be no person on the land ready to pay it."
The court also pointed out that a notice to quit would not suffice as a
demand for payment indicating the distinguishing features of the two. The
purpose of the demand for payment is to afford the tenant a reasonable opportunity to make payment while the purpose of the notice to quit is to give the
tenant time to prepare for eviction once he has failed to respect the demand.
"Is a window located in a tenant's apartment an inherent and integral part
of the wall of the building-a defect in which might affect other tenants and
parts of the building-so that control and possession of the window are retained
by the landlord rather than the tenant?" This was the issue to be decided by the
Supreme Court in Lopez v. Gukenback,5" a case of first impression. The court
answered the issue in the negative and refused plaintiff's claim for personal
injuries. The court reasoned that any structural support furnished by the window is infinitesimally small, and that its primary purpose is for the admission
of light and air. Also the presence of the window has no functional use in
connection with the other apartments and thus, reasoned the court, it is not part
of, but simply an opening in the wall to make liveable this particular apartment.
Justices Musmanno and Cohen dissented from the majority opinion on the
reasoning and authority of Germansen v. Egan " where recovery was allowed
for injuries resulting from a defective skylight on substantially the same theory
advanced by the plaintiff in the Lopez case.
The problem which concerned the Supreme Court in Bogutz v. Margolin
was the extent to which a clause in the lease absolved the landlord of liability
and the coverage of the phrase "on or about the premises". The court held that
reference to "premises" included a portion of the basement of the apartment
house although tenant's rented apartment was located on the sixth floor of the
building. The court drew the somewhat nebulous distinction that the phrase
"demised premises" referred to the apartment rented while "premises" referred
to and included the basement area.
54 391 Pa. 359, 137 A.2d 771 (1958).
55 130 Pa. Super. 21, 196 At. 881 (1937).
56392

Pa. 151, 139 A.2d 649 (1958).
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A case illustrating the extent to which a tenant is bound by the terms of his
lease was Osso v. Rohanna."7 Here the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held
that failure of the landlord to replace a worn out heater and to repair a urinal
did not justify termination of the lease by the tenants. In upholding a directed
verdict for the landlord for remaining rent reserved to the end of a lease, the
court noted that the landlord, under the terms of the lease, was under no duty
to install a new heater and also that he was discouraged from repairing the
urinal by the tenant since notice was given that the tenant was moving out.
MINERAL RIGHTS

An interesting and provocative decision was rendered by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Yuscavage v. Hamlin. 8 In an action to quiet title which
presented a question as to ownership of subsurface gas and oil estates, the court
held that a deed conveying all of grantor's estate, right, title, interest, property,
possession, claim, and demand in and to the premises except for reservation of
coal, conveyed title to subsurface gas and oil. This decision is worthy of note
since a study of the deed in question disclosed that the deed conveyed "All the
surface and right of soil" of the two tracts in question, and also that the deed
uses the word "land" throughout when referring to the subject matter of the
conveyance. The court in rendering its decision relied on the principle that
the habendum clause in a deed serves to define the estate created and that the
habendum clause of the deed in question was drafted in the typical language
which would convey an estate in fee simple.
In Windber Construction Company v. Coleman " the Superior Court was
faced with an interpretation of a mineral lease providing for minimum royalties
to be paid to the lessor. In a proceeding to open a judgment entered by confession for the lessor, the court held the case should have been submitted to the
jury for determination of factual issues. The issue to be decided by the court
was when and under what conditions the obligation to pay the minimum royalties was to terminate. In the absence of specific language in the lease on this
point, the court determined that since lessee was to excavate, mine and remove
all merchantable coal that could be practicably, economically and profitably
strip mined, the obligation to pay minimum royalties existed until this was accomplished. Thus the case was remanded in order to determine this factual
issue.
57 187 Pa. Super. 280, 144 A.2d 862 (1958).
58

391 Pa. 13, 137 A.2d 242 (1958).

59 185 Pa. Super. 649, 139 A.2d 675 (1958).
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The difficulty and expense of failing to provide for all forseeable contingencies in the drafting of a lease was illustrated once again in the case of Hatnish v. Shannon."0 The plaintiff-lessor entered into a mineral lease with defendant-lessee wherein lessee was to pay royalties on all coal which the lessee
would "mine and ship from said premises". The lessee was expressly relieved
from mining any minimum amount of coal, was bound to pay minimum royalties
equal only to taxes becoming due and payable on the premises and was expressly
given authority to sublease the coal. Subsequent to this agreement, defendant
entered into a lease with Pennsylvania Edison Company with a provision that a
minimum royalty would be paid to defendant so long as merchantable and marketable coal remained. The Company defaulted on the lease and was ordered
to pay defendant a substantial sum pursuant to their agreement. In refusing
plaintiff's claim for an accounting of royalties, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that plaintiff's rights must be found within the borders of the contract
entered into with defendant and that in absence of provision to the contrary,
plaintiff may not avail himself of any benefits of the sublease. The court notes
that the mere fact that a party makes an improvident bargain will not lead a
court to make unnatural implications from the terms of a lease.
Moravecz v. Hillman Coal & Coke Company 11 was another case before the
Supreme Court in which a term of a mineral lease in coal was in issue. There
it was held that a provision in the lease obligating the lessee to "drill a well and
install a pump to furnish a sufficient supply of good water" in the event that
the mining interfered with the water supply, was fully performed by lessee when
the well was drilled and a supply of good water was furnished for approximately
21 years, long after mining operations had ceased. The court was unimpressed
by the argument that the lessee intended to become an insurer of good water,
especially in view of the generally known uncertainty as to the continued existence of springs and wells.
KUCHKA.
EMINENT DOMAIN

In Perlav. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania62 a portion of appellant's land

had been appropriated by the Commonwealth for use in the relocation and
widening of a state highway route. The lower court awarded damages in the
sum of $35,000. Appellant contended that the lower court erred in instructing
the jury that loss of water supply was not to be considered as an element of
damage. The charge to the jury was held not to be erroneous by the Supreme
60 392 Pa. 419, 141 A.2d 347 (1958).
61 393 Pa. 289, 141 A.2d 570 (1958).
62 392 Pa. 96, 139 A.2d 673 (1958).
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Court in view of the fact that the deprivation was "temporary, purely incidental
to the new construction work, and did not constitute a taking, injury or destruction of the owner's property right in his usual water supply."
The Constitution of Pennsylvania 6 clearly provides for compensation only
where private property be "taken or applied to public use" by the Commonwealth and judicial authority is abundant to the effect that incidental and
consequential damage is not compensable, where the state is exercising its
power of eminent domain, in the absence of statutory provision.
The Commonwealth in Tantalas v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ", put
forth the novel contention that a highway plan approved by the Governorwhich plan revealed that no ground was taken from the person whose property
adjoins the highway under construction or improvement-is conclusive proof
that in fact no ground was taken.
This contention seems to be buttressed from two sources. First, the following statutory provision, "The approval of such plan or plans by the Governor
shall be considered to be the condemnation of an easement for highway purposes
from all property within the lines marked as required for right of way and the
condemnation of an easement of support or protection from all property within
the lines marked as required for slopes." 65 Second, judicial statements of the
following tenor, that the plan "must control in determining the extent of the
land taken" 6 and that "the plan is conclusive, unless legally modified." 67
The statutory provision has been given effect, and the judicial statements
expressed in cases in which there was no dispute as to where the lines shown in
the official plan were actually projected on the ground, but only a question of
how much of the ground as shown in the plan was actually appropriated. Thus
if the plan indicates a certain area of land is to be taken and there is no dispute
as to the physical location of this area on the ground, the plan is then conclusive
that the entire area was appropriated so long as a part was entered upon-even
though the state may only use a fraction of the land for actual construction.
In this case, where projection of the lines was actually disputed the lower
court was sustained in deeming a factual inquiry necessary to determine the exact
location of the lines upon the ground and thus whether any of plaintiff's land
had been appropriated.
63 Pa. Const. art. 1, § 10 (3).
64

392 Pa. 315, 140 A.2d 790 (1958).

65 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36 § 670-210 (Supp. 1958).

66 See Penn Builders Inc. v. Blair County, 302 Pa. 300, 153 Atd. 433 (1931).
67 See May v. Westmoreland County, 98 Pa. Super. 488 (1929).
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LATERAL SUPPORT

Plaintiff brought an action for a mandatory injunction to compel the defendant to construct a retaining wall in Bradley v. Valicenti.," Plaintiff's land
began to subside as a result of excavating conducted on defendant's adjacent lot.
In affirming the lower court's decision, the Supreme Court held a mandatory
injunction to be a proper mode of relief.
The jurisdiction of a court of equity to issue a mandatory injunction to
restore lateral support has long been recognized in Pennsylvania, but seldom, if
ever, granted. The courts have been extremely cautious in granting such relief,
undoubtedly fearful that it might entail prolonged and detailed court supervision, or that damages would suffice as an adequate remedy.
By giving recognition to this long dormant right, and allaying its fears of
supervision (at least where not detailed) the court has given future litigants an
additional remedy by which they can seek redress from the infringment of the
right to lateral support. It would seem especially desirable where the amount
of damage is nebulous or of little consequence.
WATER AND WATER RIGHTS

In Daniels v. Bethlehem Mines Corporation 9 the defendant coal company
had a recorded written agreement creating an easement which gave the right to
discharge "mine water pumped, taken or raised from the mine or mines" into a
stream which flowed over plaintiff's farm. The grant-given by plaintiff's predecessor in title-also contained a release "from all damages of any character
incident to the flowing of said mine water." Plaintiff suffered damage to his
farm and cattle when defendant began discharging highly colored water into
the stream carrying mine waste, muck, sludge, and other waste materials. The
Supreme Court, in affirming the refusal of the court below to lift the compulsory
non-suit, held that defendant had not exceeded its rights granted under the
easement and that the release was binding upon plaintiff and a bar to any action
instituted by him.
Does the right to discharge mine water include the right to discharge mine
waste, muck, sludge, and other waste materials? Was this the intention of the
parties as gathered from the wording of their agreement? Did the release bar
an action for damage caused other than by mine water? These question the court
answered in the affirmative. And though it is submitted that this is a somewhat
liberal construction, it is not without judicial precedent.
68 185 Pa. Super. 403, 138 A.2d 238 (1958).

r9 391 Pa. 195, 137 A.2d 304 (1958).
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Query whether the court would be as willing to allow our streams to be
polluted to such an extent where the act was done by one other than a person
engaged in the coal industry.
The burrowing of marmots brought the case of Duncan v. Gheen "obefore
our courts for consideration. The plaintiff had acquired the right to water from
a certain spring located on defendant's adjacent land. The marmots managed
to divert the underground flow of the water and it resurfaced 100 feet south of
its original location. The question arose as to whether the plaintiff's right to
the water still existed. It was held that it had not been extinguished.
It has oft been repeated that the rights of an easement owner should be
measured and defined by the purpose and character of the easement and would
include all such rights as are incidental or necessary to the reasonable and proper
enjoyment of the easement. Clearly then the grant in this case was properly
construed to encompass a right to the water flowing from the spring regardless
of its location, especially in view of the fact that no additional burden was
placed on the servient estate.
Query whether the court would not have been on firmer ground had they
called this interest a profit . prendre rather than an easement.71
In Shaffer v. Baylor's Lake Association 72 the Supreme Court in reversing
the decision of the lower court stated that the same minutiae of proof would
not be required to establish rights under an ancient easement as would be required in cases where there is or should be ample proof available. Plaintiff
acquired by prescription use of the non-navigable lake's waters for boating,
fishing, swimming, and skating purposes through adverse, open, notorious and
continuous use since 1903.
It is interesting to note that the court labeled this easement one in gross
rather than appurtenant by stating that the rights had not attached to the land.
It appears that the rights claimed in the use of the water were an appropriate
and useful adjunct of plaintiff's land and therefore in the nature of an easement
appurtenant. In view of the fact that easements in gross are now assignable in
Pennsylvania it seems to be a question of little import. 7"
LICENSES

That licenses conferring authority to do particular acts upon another's land
can become irrevocable was again illustrated in Messinger v. Township of
70

185 Pa. Super. 328, 138 A.2d 168 (1958).

71 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY,

vol. 3,

§ 765 (3d ed. 1939).

392 Pa. 493, 141 A.2d 583 (1958).
73Miller v. Lutheran Conference and Camp Ass'n. 331 Pa. 241, 200 Atd. 646 (1938).
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Ulashington." The defendant had received oral permission from plaintiff's
predecessor in title to drain water from a township road on to plaintiff's abutting
property. The court pointed out that the principle of equitable estoppel was
applicable, and since defendant had spent a considerable amount of money in
installing the drain and additional expenditures would be necessary to relocate
it, the license would not be subject to revocation at the will of the plaintiff.
The courts of Pennsylvania have often announced this doctrine of irrevocability in going beyond the common law rule and holdings in most other states."
PAGLIANETE.
74 185 Pa. Super. 554, 137 A.2d 890 (1958).
75 Leninger v. Goodman, 277 Pa. 75, 120 Atd. 772 (1923).

